STATE v. MEICHER, 2003 WI App 42

260 Wis.2d 602, 658 N.W.2d 87

State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent v. Joseph M. Meicher, Defendant-Appellant.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.
No. 02-1363-CR.
January 30, 2003.

[EDITOR’S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Columbia County: RICHARD L. REHM and JAMES O. MILLER, Judges. Affirmed.

¶ 1. LUNDSTEN, J.[1]

[1] This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to Wis. Stat. §752.31(2)(f) (1999-2000). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise noted.

Joseph M. Meicher appeals a judgment of the circuit court finding him guilty of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated as a second offense. Meicher argues that evidence obtained from a blood draw taken after his arrest should have been suppressed for two reasons: (1) his consent was involuntary because the implied consent law unconstitutionally coerces consent, and (2) without consent, a search warrant was needed to analyze his blood sample. We disagree and affirm.[2]

Background¶ 2. Meicher was arrested for driving while under the influence of an intoxicant. The arresting officer read an “Informing the Accused” form to Meicher, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4), Wisconsin’s implied consent law, and Meicher consented to the drawing of a blood sample. The blood sample was analyzed two days later.

¶ 3. Meicher moved to suppress the blood sample and the results of the blood test. The trial court denied the motion, and Meicher pled no contest to operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.

Discussion¶ 4. Meicher contends the implied consent law produces coerced “consent” because it effectively threatens citizens with a penalty if they do not consent. In State v. Wintlend, 2002 WI App. 314, No. 02-0965-CR, review denied (Wis. Jan. 14, 2003), we rejected that argument, concluding that any coercion imposed by the implied consent statute is not unreasonable and is thus constitutional. Id. at ¶¶ 8-18. Therefore, Meicher’s consent was voluntary.

¶ 5. Because Meicher’s consent was voluntary, his assertion that a search warrant was needed to analyze his blood necessarily fails. InState v. VanLaarhoven, 2001 WI App. 275, 248 Wis.2d 881, 637 N.W.2d 411, we considered whether police officers could obtain a blood sample and analyze that sample without obtaining a search warrant under a motorist’s consent pursuant to Wisconsin’s implied consent law. We concluded that “by operation of law and by submitting to the tests, VanLaarhoven consented to a taking of a sample of his blood and the chemical analysis of that sample.” Id. at ¶ 8; see also Village of Little Chute v.Walitalo, 2002 WI App. 211, ¶ 1 n. 2, 256 Wis.2d 1032, 650 N.W.2d 891
(construing the VanLaarhoven decision to state that “the examination of a blood sample seized pursuant to the warrant requirement or an exception to the warrant requirement is an essential part of the seizure and does not require a separate judicially authorized warrant”). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.

[2] Meicher also moved to suppress evidence on the theory that the blood sample was not obtained pursuant to the exigency exception to the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment. Meicher argued that the availability of statutorily equivalent breath test evidence extinguished the exigency circumstances necessary to obtain the blood sample without a warrant. However, he concedes that this argument was rejected in Statev. Krajewski, 2002 WI 97, 255 Wis.2d 98, 648 N.W.2d 385, and raises this issue on appeal in order to preserve an appeal on the possibility that the United States Supreme Court overturns Krajewski. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Krajewski on December 16, 2002,Krajewski v. Wisconsin, cert. denied, 71 U.S.L.W. 3415 (U.S. Dec. 16, 2002) (No. 02-719), and thus we need not address this argument further.